Friday, December 28, 2007

CBS Year End Review: Standard Pacific

Standard Pacific is down 84% since I initiated coverage on March 30, 2007. (Red S indicates blog posts where "sell" is reiterated.)

In my first SPF post, I talked about how the assets on the balance sheet were greatly overvalued, and would require significant further writedowns. I also brought up the issue of the two layers of financial leverage thanks to the joint-venture deals.

Also, this observation proved to be an understatement:

And when land values fall, they fall hard. They are a bet on home prices and builder profit margins.

I grant that the old JV land, and the old land owned (if any), are undervalued on the books. But my suspicion is that the amount of that land is dwarfed by the way overpriced land.
On October 3, I questioned the reasoning behind a huge homebuilder rally sparked by Citigroup analyst Stephen Kim. Sure enough, that was not the bottom for the homebuilders.

This is an industry suffering from huge over-investment, and it needs a restructuring.

I am still short Standard Pacific, and I believe that their common stockholders will be wiped out within one year from today.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Joe Lewis and Bear Stearns

I haven't seen this mentioned in most of the articles about Joe Lewis continuing to buy shares of Bear Stearns.

Take a look at the Schedule 13D filed by Joe Lewis and his apparently related companies.

Scroll down to item 5. You can see that almost all of the shares were "acquired pursuant to exercise of options by option counterparty."

In other words, those shares got "put" to him, at prices between $90 and $110. Bear closed today at $88.

It's possible that he meant to acquire the shares that way - so that he collects a premium and then buys the shares. But it's also possible that he thought that the stock had bottomed.

Any way you slice it, selling those $110 puts was a losing trade.

Tuesday, December 25, 2007

Are Financials a Good Buy Yet?

I think this WSJ article answers that question.

Warren Buffett agreed to pay $4.5 billion to buy the majority of an industrial conglomerate from Chicago's Pritzker family, choosing to invest in products like plumbing pipes and railroad tank cars as Asian investors pour billions into U.S. financial institutions.
Who is the smart money?
With more than $45 billion in cash on its balance sheet and a triple-A credit rating, Berkshire could easily buy a stake in a big bank, brokerage or other hard-hit financial firm. But so far, Asian and Middle Eastern investors have been at the forefront of financial deals.
The Marmon investment doesn't mean Mr. Buffett has written off the U.S. financial industry. As he did with high-yield telecom bonds several years ago, Mr. Buffett typically waits until prices fall to rock-bottom levels and until few other buyers are on the hunt.

Friday, December 21, 2007

Florida Sales Tax Revenue Weak in November

From the Florida Department of Revenue, Revenue Collection Report for November 2007:

  • November 2007 sales tax collections were 5.18% below the November 2006 levels.
  • If you look at the report, FY07-08 tax receipts have been lagging FY06-07 receipts for several months now.
  • The only category of sales tax collections that is holding up is consumer non-durables.
  • Auto, construction, other durables, and business investment have been getting killed.
See my earlier post on Weak October Retail Sales in California. Almost 18% of the U.S. population lives in California or Florida.

Monday, December 17, 2007

Sea Change in California REO Pricing

This is a bad sign for loss severity at our California Savings and Loans:

Banks and other mortgage lenders are starting to deeply discount their “owned” properties – the homes they have foreclosed on – says a report Thursday from ForeclosureRadar...

“A notable sea change occurred in November. Lenders are starting to aggressively discount properties” says ForeclosureRadar founder Sean O’Toole. “We were surprised by the magnitude of the discount and even more surprised that most of the homes went back to the bank with no investor bidding in spite of the price cut.”

In one example cited by ForeclosureRadar, 8215 Shay Circle in Stockton, purchased new in January 2006 for $481,000, saw a precipitous decline in price. The loan defaulted in 2007 and the lender discounted the opening bid at auction in November to $240,000. But even then the home went back to the bank with no investor bids, the report says.
Here is some Credit Bubble Stocks background on default rates and loss severity.

Investors are increasingly walking away from houses:
“More than one-fifth of 6,557 Bay Area properties that fell into foreclosure from January through September this year were owned by investors, according to a Chronicle analysis of public records compiled by DataQuick. Of properties repossessed by lenders, 1 in 6 had been owned by people who had two or more foreclosures in their names. Eighteen Bay Area investors had five or more foreclosures.”

Sunday, December 16, 2007

New Century Financial Common Stock is a Zero

NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL CORP filed this Form 8-K on 12/14/07:

"Based on a preliminary review of the claims against the Company received by the claim bar date, the Company currently believes that there will be no recovery in respect of the Company’s outstanding common stock under the Debtors’ plan of liquidation."
You've come a long way, baby!

Friday, December 14, 2007

Downey Financial (DSL) Non-performing Loans Jump Sharply

Last month, I predicted that Downey Financial (DSL) Non-performing assets (NPA) would be sharply higher in their next data release.

Today Downey released another Thirteen Month Selected Financial Data report, and the jump in NPAs surprised even me.


Downey reports NPAs as a percentage of total assets. But not all of a bank's assets are loans. So, to make the NPA statistic more easily comparable, you can back out Downey's cash, investment securities, FHLB stock, and other assets that are not loans from the calculation.



The graph above shows NPAs as a percentage of only loans. It reveals that calculating NPAs as a percentage of total assets has been steadily understating the increase.

I have consistently maintained a "Sell" on Downey since March 15 when it was selling for $64.87. It is down 52% since then. Take a look at this writeup from April 2007 on Downey's underwriting quality.