Showing posts with label AMZN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AMZN. Show all posts

Monday, April 15, 2024

Looking at the Magnificent 7

The "Magnificent 7" companies have replaced the "FAANG" stocks, which means that Netflix has been dropped from the growthy-tech investor zeitgeist and Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla have been added. The combined market capitalization of the Mag 7 is $14 trillion, which is equal to one-third of the total market capitalization of the S&P 500 companies ($43 trillion). 

That is a very high level of concentration in the top index picks, which means that the returns for the float adjusted, market capitalization weighted index that most index investors buy (SPY) will likely be meaningfully different than the returns on the equally weighted index (e.g. RSP). (The equal weight RSP is trading for 19x earnings versus 21.5x for the SPY.)

Since we are generalists at CBS, it is "our business to know" what is going on with everything, even the frothy Magnificent 7. I thought that we should take a look at the cash generation power of these businesses. What do you get for $14 trillion? How are the free cash flow conversion margins - are these actually good businesses - and what is the valuation (FCF/EV)?

Before I did that, I wrote down my subjective view of business quality or moat for each, on a one to five scale. I am a customer of five of the seven (i.e. all of them except Nvidia and Tesla). How hard would it be for me to fire them? How hard do I think it would be for a team of well-funded 10x engineers to disrupt them? 

Based on that framework, I think that Tesla is 1/5; clearly the worst. (It now has the smallest market capitalization by a significant margin, while it was once larger than Facebook.) I think that Apple is clearly the best, 5/5. I gave Nvidia 4/5 although I am not very familiar with the company or its products. I think that Microsoft, Amazon, and Google are 3s and Facebook is a 2. (Without Instagram, Facebook would be a 1.)

How did my subjective view line up with the numbers? Surprisingly well. Click the table below to enlarge:


Some observations that stand out:

Microsoft blew an entire quarter's revenue, $65 billion, on the acquisition of Activision. But even adding that back, Apple generated almost as much free cash flow ($34.5 billion) as the other six companies combined ($46 billion).

Apple has the second highest free cash flow margin (29% of revenue) of the Mag 7. Nvidia's was 46%, a tobacco-like margin. We know that Amazon is a low margin retail business, Tesla is a joke of course, but Microsoft and Google have very lackluster free cash flow conversion.

Google's stock based compensation (SBC) in the most recent quarter was equal to 30% of cash from operations, and capital expenditures were equal to 58% of cash from operations. (Or 6% of revenue and 9% of revenue, respectively, if you want to look at it that way.)

Apple spent only 8% of cash from operations on SBC in the most recent quarter (3% of revenue), and only 6% of CFO on capital expenditure (2% of revenue), leaving much more free cash flow.

We know that Google is an inferior business to Apple because Google pays a gigantic tithe to Apple. But notice that Apple's most recent quarter cash flow was running at a 5% yield on the enterprise value. That is much more attractive than the other companies in the Mag 7 (which otherwise seem quite expensive).

Apple seems to have the best combination of moat and valuation. If you had to own one of the Mag 7, Apple would be our choice, hands-down, based on business quality and valuation. (Maybe you do have to own one. How far from the S&P 500 index and its performance are you allowed to stray?)

Berkshire has $156 billion of Apple stock, just over a quarter of its own market capitalization. We do not like Buffett's energy pick, but we do like his tech pick.

Thursday, October 27, 2022

This Earnings Season Vindicates the Value vs Growth Hypothesis

This quarter's earnings season has been vindicating the "value vs growth" hypothesis. The "growth" companies that have long been considered bulletproof and which were valued very expensively are reporting falling earnings, while value companies that are valued less expensively are turning out to have pricing power and are reporting higher earnings.

Growth
Let's go through some examples, starting with the three gigantic growth disappointments, Facebook, Google, and Amazon. These are important because the "FAAG" stocks dominate the indices and have had a tremendous run for more than a decade with consistently rising earnings and rising multiples that crescendoed last year. (Note: the second "A" in FAAG is Apple, which is arguably a value stock, and notably the only one of the four that Buffett has ever owned.)

Wasteland Capital posted a good analysis of the Facebook quarter. Revenue was down 4% in Q3 2022 vs the year ago quarter, but costs and expenses were up 19%. The result was that EBIT fell 46%, operating margin fell from 36% to 20%, and diluted earnings per share got cut in half to $1.64. 

Facebook is now trading for 15x earnings. Does that mean we should dump our Philip Morris and buy META since the multiple is about the same? Well, what if PM is actually the better business? Because the cash flow numbers for Facebook were even worse, thanks to Zuckerberg's huge investment in the "Metaverse" boondoggle. 

Look at the cash flow statement. For the first nine months of this year, Facebook had net income plus depreciation of $25 billion versus $36 billion the prior year. Capital expenditures this year to date have been $24 billion versus $14 billion. Free cash flow has dropped to nothing. As someone on Twitter pointed out, it "just swung from 50% cash flow margins to 0%, in one year, at scale, with strong market position. Are there any examples in history similar?"

What is also interesting is that the company borrowed money, despite not having free cash flow, to buy back stock. This is like looking at an oil company annual report from 2013. Someone else asked, "What if Zuck knows already that Facebook's core, advertisement based business model is ultimately doomed and that the Metaverse is the only chance to survive?"

At Google, again see Wasteland Capital's post. Revenue in the third quarter was up 6% versus the prior year, but costs were up 18%, resulting in an operating margin decrease from 32% to 25%. Earnings per share fell from $1.40 to $1.06 so it is now trading for 22x earnings. One of the big drivers is that the number of employees grew from 150k a year ago to 187k. And again, even worse is what happened to free cash flow. For the quarter, net income plus depreciation was $18 billion versus $22 billion a year ago. Capex went from $6.8 billion to $7.3 billion.

Wasteland Capital's writeup of Amazon's results is brutal: "Bezos’ China-goods flea-market delivered a steaming pile..." Operating income for the quarter was cut in half from the prior year. North America went from a small profit to a loss. Operating cash flow decreased 27% to $39.7 billion for the trailing twelve months, compared with $54.7 billion for the trailing twelve months ended September 30, 2021. Our preferred metric "Free cash flow less equipment finance leases and principal repayments of all other finance leases and financing obligations" decreased to an outflow of $21.5 billion for the trailing twelve months, compared with an outflow of $3.9 billion for the trailing twelve months ended September 30, 2021.

Investors in growth stocks were double counting - the companies were over-earning and these earnings were being capitalized at high multiples. Now that they are past peak cycle, the earnings are falling and they are being re-rated, and the shares are plunging. The NASDAQ is down 31% year-to-date. (Interestingly, the equal weight S&P 500 is down 14% YTD and SPY is down 19%.)

So those are the big three "growth" examples. We have to put that in quotes now because their earnings are declining. They still have a combined $2.6 trillion market capitalization (down from $5 trillion at the peak!) and collectively they do not generate much cash (thanks to Amazon's cash burn and Facebook's "Metaverse" bet). 

Someday, the ex-growth companies expenses will be slashed, their earnings will bottom, and by then they will undoubtedly trade at cheap multiples. But that may take a long time since Facebook and Google are dual share class corporate governance disasters. And the knock-on effects of those SG&A cuts will ripple far and wide - any prospective investment should be evaluated for such exposure. (It would be interesting to compare what percentage of tech employees use nicotine versus energy sector employees.)

Value
Now that we have surveyed some of the growth wreckage, let us turn to the value results. As we mentioned, these companies are turning out to have pricing power and are reporting higher earnings thanks to various combinations of price increases and higher sales volumes.

Back in August the Biden administration claimed that this summer's refined fuel demand was lower than it had been in July 2020. (When fuel prices spiked in June, the EIA did not publish their data for two weeks because of a "voltage irregularity," then claimed that demand had fallen to below pandemic levels.) We knew that the data was wrong because midstream companies and refiners, like Magellan and Valero, were contradicting it in their Q2 results. Oil was below $100 per barrel for almost all of the third quarter, so it is interesting to see what third quarter reports are saying about demand. From the Valero conference call for Q3:

Q: "When you talk about demand surpassing 2019 levels for gasoline and diesel, is that primarily driven by strengthening your export channels? Is domestic demand in your areas of service equally strong?"

A: "Really, it's the domestic markets and our wholesale volumes have trended considerably higher. We set a wholesale volume record in August. We beat that in September, and we're on pace to beat it again in October. So wholesale volumes continue to trend higher. If you look at the pump market through our wholesale channels of trade, gasoline is trending about 8% above where we were pre-pandemic levels. Diesel volumes are trending about 32% above where we were pre-pandemic levels. So seeing really strong domestic demand through our wholesale channels of trade."

Q: "you talked about bulletproofing your balance sheet in the prior quarter, and you mentioned evaluating further reductions in your prepared remarks. How much lower would you like to get on your leverage"

A: "on the cash side, we're at a $4 billion cash balance, we talked about how, going forward, we like to hold more cash at $3 billion to $4 billion probably on the base level. But if you're looking at potentially higher flat price levels or economic downturn, you maybe want to hold a little bit more. So we bias to the upper end of that. So we're close to a good spot on both of those. On a long-term debt to cap -- net debt to cap, we have a 20% to 30% range that we target. We're at 24.5% now at the end of the third quarter, down from 40% at the highest point toward COVID. So we've been working in the right direction. I'd like to be even lower, you'd like to be at the 20% range [of debt to capital] to give you more financial flexibility going forward"

Q: "a part of that meeting [with the White House] was meant to see if there was any possibility if somebody could start a refinery up and we discuss -- the industry discuss the difficulty in doing that and that was really the main coming ones."

A: "there was consideration for the ability to restart refining capacity that had been shut down. And I think the general sentiment was that, that wasn't going to happen. Of course, we're not in that boat. But I mean, people had very good reasons for making the decisions that they made, and they weren't in a position to unwind those decisions. So, the solution is going to probably have to come from some waving of regulation or just reduction in demand, which we just haven't seen to-date."

Q: "You brought it up as there is obviously a risk of a slowing economic cycle out there. What level would you think about a typical recession impact in terms of fuel demand, recognizing gasoline is already well below what we would call, kind of, a normal environment. [...] I'm just wondering how you think about the typical magnitude impact of a recession on fuel demand."

A: "I guess as the guys have, kind of, gone back and looked at recessionary period in the past, they see their product demand has hit about two times GDP. So whatever GDP assumption you're going to have, you would take twice that on the impact of fuel demand. And as you mentioned, more of that is going to be diesel, less on gasoline. I think there are some unique situations as we head into next year. One, jet demand hasn't fully recovered. And so you'll have a good increase in jet demand as we would anticipate, and then Chinese oil demand has been down 20%. At some point in time, they will come out of the pandemic, and you would expect to see Chinese demand recover. So the combination of both those things is that we would expect, even with the typical recessionary period, you may see year-over-year global oil demand growth."

Valero reported earnings of $2.8 billion, or $7.19 per share, for Q3 2022, compared to $463 million, or $1.13 per share, for Q3 2021. That's less than 5x earnings on an annualized basis. Valero's net income plus depreciation for the year-to-date has been $10.5 billion. Capital expenditures have been $2 billion. With that remaining free cash flow, they spent $2.4 billion repaying debt, $1.2 billion on dividends, and $2.8 billion on share repurchases. Remember, this is only a $50 billion market capitalization company.

A few observations about the conference call excerpts. Oil and product demand is very strong even at current high fuel prices. Management is still depressed even though they are raking in money - they want to keep paying down debt. And no one sees a way to increase capacity in the industry.

We also see evidence of strong demand at Magellan Midstream, which reported results this morning. Their refined product shipments were flat Q3 2022 vs Q3 2021, but the transportation revenue per barrel shipped was up 8.7%. (And refined product shipments are up 4% year-to-date versus the first nine months of 2021, with the revenue per barrel up 3%.)

On a market cap of $11 billion and an enterprise value of $16 billion, Magellan's guidance is for $1.1 billion of distributable cash flow. So far this year, they have distributed $685 million and made $473 million of unit repurchases. (During the third quarter, they bought back 2.7 million units at an average price of about $50 per unit.) Units outstanding are down 3.5% year-to-date and the dividend yield this year has run about 8%. 

Amazingly, the MMP dividend yield was only 4% at the beginning of 2014 when the ten year bond was yielding 3%. The Magellan equity risk premium over its own 2050 note is now 160 bps, which has come down significantly. Of course, we must remember that inflation will make a big difference to the real returns of the debt holders versus the equity holders.

Altria also reported results this morning. The most important thing was that operating income in the smokeable segment (i.e. cigarettes) was up despite a bad volume decrease:

Net revenues decreased 1.6%, primarily driven by lower shipment volume and higher promotional investments, partially offset by higher pricing. Revenues net of excise taxes increased 0.4%. Reported OCI increased 1.4%, primarily driven by higher pricing, partially offset by lower shipment volume, higher promotional investments, higher costs and 2021 NPM Adjustment Items.

Smokeable income for the quarter went from $2.75 billion to $2.79 billion. Oral tobacco went from $405 to $425 million. Total operating income from $2.95 billion to $3.1 billion (5% increase). We've noticed that Altria has been heavily promoting their on! oral nicotine product, and indeed the volumes were up 68% year-over-year. 

Recall from earlier in this post how much money Facebook, Amazon, and Google are spending on capital expenditures - hundreds of billions of dollars over time. As Devin LaSarre points out regarding Altria, its capital expenditures are only a couple hundred million dollars: "unreal how much money this company makes with so little reinvested."

As we know, Altria owns 10% of AB Inbev (BUD), which also reported today. If you click through, you'll notice the pricing power (we have seen this across various branded consumer staples) - volumes up 3.7% but revenue up 12%.

Results from Suncor Energy are not in yet, but they made an interesting announcement:

Suncor Energy today announced that it has agreed to purchase an additional 21.3% working interest in the Fort Hills Project and associated sales and logistics agreements from Teck Resources Limited, for consideration of $1 billion. Upon closing, Suncor's aggregate share in the project will increase to 75.4%. The acquisition will be funded by cash from asset sale processes currently underway and the company remains on track with its previously articulated capital allocation framework.

They had previously announced that they sold their wind and solar assets to a Canadian utility, and that covers much of the cost of this working interest purchase. The one remaining partner in Fort Hills is a French energy company that thinks oil will be obsolete by 2050. It is a great sign that our management is picking up barrels, and hopefully they will buy out the stupid, politically correct French super-major oil company.

Recall what we wrote in our "New Milestones in the Value vs Growth Trade" post.

Further signs that the value vs growth trade is continuing will be redemptions from growth funds (that beget further selling), reversal of the ESG mandates and divestments of value stocks by institutions, insider selling and share issuances to fund losses at growth companies despite the lower prices, and a ripple effect up the growth quality and maturity ladders as the unprofitable growth companies buy less advertising and other services from even the profitable, mature FANGs ("cascading revenue declines"). 

It looks like the Facebook and Google are starting to suffer from the cascading revenue declines. But they must only just be starting, because Amazon Web Services is still holding up. Even Cathie Wood's "ARKK" ETF is still attracting inflows. 

A couple of ways to look at the big cap growth bubble is to chart the performance of the market capitalization weighted S&P 500 (SPY) ETF versus the equal weight S&P 500 (RSP) ETF, or chart the Vanguard IT versus Vanguard Energy.

We are still in the opening innings of the reversal in value versus growth, but today was a big drawdown for growth investors. Do you even hear any of them questioning themselves? From what I can see, they are blaming macro factors and not considering the strategic factor bet.

Monday, September 11, 2017

Andrew Wylie On Amazon & Book Publishing (2013)

Really funny interview with literary agent Andrew Wylie.

LB: I once tried to interview [Amazon Publishing head] Larry Kirshbaum. Amazon did not seem eager to make that happen.

AW: [rolls eyes] Larry came to see me at the London Book Fair last year and asked when I was going to sell a book to Amazon. I said, “Never,” and he said, “Never say never,” and I said, “Larry, never. Goodbye.”

It’s not serious. They can’t get their books into any bookstores.

LB: But what if bookstores carried their books?

AW: It would be a different game. And if they hired a couple of civilized people. They don’t publish anything of any interest to anyone.

LB: They do better with genre fiction, at least.

AW: They can do all of that shit. Take over daytime television, too. They are deeply into refrigeration.

Saturday, January 2, 2016

2016 Begins with Ultra Distressed Energy Companies on the Brink

Judging by the bond prices, many of these are likely to file in 2016:

  • ZINC, the July 2017 3.8% note trading at 20 cents; ytm 155%
  • GDP, the 8.875% notes traded at 8; current yield >100%.
  • EXXI, the 3% notes traded at 6; current yield 50% and ytm 145%
  • TC, the 7.375% notes traded at ytm of 134%
  • SD, the 8.75% notes traded at 12; ytm >100%
  • PVA, the 7.25% notes traded at 13; ytm>100%
  • BTU, the 6% notes traded at 18.2; ytm 88%
  • CLF, the 5.95% notes traded at 28; ytm 88%
  • LINE, the 8.625% notes traded at 16; ytm 78%
  • XCO, the 7.5% notes traded at 27; ytm 72%
  • SSE, the 6.5% notes traded at 16; ytm 54%
Energy and resources. These companies have a combined market cap of $1.67 billion. In all likelihood based on the bond prices, that is illusory. Maybe in 2016 lots of illusory wealth will be revealed as worthless.

What if FB ad revenue that is funded by VC equity contracts, and the multiple contracts, and much of that $300 billion market cap is revealed as illusory? What if the Amazon flywheel runs in the opposite direction (both AWS, as an expression of the VC bubble, and the traditional business, as an expression of consumer spending), and some of that $317 billion market cap is revealed as illusory?

What if the replacement cycle on Apple devices lengthens, or consumers get tired of paying 100% markups for memory, and some of that $587 billion market cap is revealed as illusory wealth?

Well, then, we'd have a bear market.

Thursday, September 11, 2014

Another Thought About Amazon and The Everything Store

Followup thought on my review of The Everything Store: Amazon's market capitalization is more than half the value of WalMart already. And it's not like Amazon is likely going to be worth over a trillion dollars - you probably can't make 10x on it. And you could lose 100% if something bad happens to discretionary spending or shipping costs. And no cash flows in the interim!

Wednesday, September 10, 2014

Review of The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon by Brad Stone

I never know what to make of Amazon. I buy more and more there every year. It used to just be new books, but now I buy my used books there instead of Half.com (too eBay-ish). Also buy any mp3s, certain office supplies, electronics (sorry Radio Shack), power tools, basically most things that are SKU'd and branded. I would never buy anything unbranded on there because that type of stuff always turns out to cheap junk from China.

Of course, anyone looking at Amazon stock wonders about the $150 billion enterprise valuation versus the $4 billion in EBITDA. Revenue and gross profit (27% gross margin) grow at a fast clip but EBIT does not.

Bezos is also just a fascinating fellow. I've written about the 10,000 Year Clock before. Before reading The Everything Store biography and corporate history, I did not know he had invested in Google. (And I forgot that Amazon was established well before Google.) I wonder how much money the very early Google investment turned into? It also says that he invested in Twitter and Uber.

Certainly the story of Amazon is fascinating. However, It's amazing that people are writing business books that have no charts, no financial statements, no valuation ratios. Journalists really are not good at reporting the type of details that would help you understand a business, and the decisions that management and investors made over time.

Journalists prefer sensational, emotional stories that follow an arc. Bezos' wife was annoyed with The Everything Store and gave it 1 star in her Amazon review! At least with the Vanderbilt or Carnegie biographies, there's the excuse that the detailed financial data would be so hard to come by.

Instead, read last week's Amazon essay, Why Amazon Has No Profits (And Why It Works). As he puts it,

"On one hand, there is the ruthless, relentless, ferociously efficient company that’s building the Sears Roebuck of the 21st Century. But on the other, there is the fact that almost 20 years after it was launched, it has yet to report a meaningful profit."
His take is that Amazon, at the highest level of abstraction, is a venture capital fund.

Amazon wholly owns a number of portfolio businesses which are at different stages of maturity. Certain businesses (books?) are well established and profitable. Others are "startups" that are unprofitable because they are new or because they are using Bezos favorite loss-leader strategy.

Evans thinks that the money is going into more fulfillment capacity and to expanding Amazon Web Services, the "cloud" on which an amazing number of internet companies are run. He says, "when you buy Amazon stock (the main currency with which Amazon employees are paid, incidentally), you are buying a bet that he can convert a huge portion of all commerce to flow through the Amazon machine."

The most important Bezos concept is the flywheel, and it's worth having in your mental toolkit.

With regard to Amazon, I think the bullish thesis - they are unprofitable because of growth investments - is probably right. The problem is, there's a way for that thesis to be right and for bulls to still lose. What happens if the future of discretionary purchasing - and that's all Amazon is for - isn't that bright? What if American consumers find a lower level of confidence that better fits their reduced future circumstances, and they tighten their belts?

Then the flywheel would essentially run backwards; the huge fixed costs of the capex investments working against you.

3/5

Friday, April 11, 2014

Amazon Shareholder Letter

From Bezos:

"Customers love Prime. More than one million customers joined Prime in the third week of December alone, and there are now tens of millions of Prime members worldwide. On a per customer basis, Prime members are ordering more items, across more categories, than ever before. Even internally, it’s easy for us to forget that Prime was a new, unproven (some even said foolhardy) concept when we launched it nine years ago: all-you-can-eat, two-day shipping for a flat annual fee. At that time, we had one million eligible Prime products. This year, we passed 20 million eligible products, and we continue to add more. We’ve made Prime better in other ways too, adding new digital benefits – including the Kindle Owners’ Lending Library and Prime Instant Video. And we’re not done. We have many ideas for how to make Prime even better."
In case you missed it, the amazing Kiva robotic warehouse robots.

Friday, December 20, 2013

Kiva Robotic Distribution



Now owned by Amazon.

Products Should Organize Themselves!

Saturday, February 23, 2013

Speaking of Amazon - Ultimate Factories

Amazon wouldn't be much without UPS. A correspondent writes in with this National Geographic Ultimate Factories video:

Thursday, January 19, 2012

The 10,000 Year Clock

Jeff Bezos is paying to have a 10,000 year clock built in the wilderness. Watch this video of a 12.5' dia, 500 foot deep vertical shaft being drilled using "raise boring", a fascinating drilling technique.

The clock is an awesome engineering challenge that represents the greatness of Western Civilization. And it is privately funded!